The Mechanical World

The aim of this book is to develop a metaphysical account of mechanisms. So far, the new mechanistic literature has mainly focused on epistemic issues such as scientific explanation, scientific discovery, and causal modelling. This book takes a difference stance: I will investigate in which sense mechanisms are things in the world; what our ontology has to look like in order for mechanisms to exist, and its implications for causation, levels, and part–whole relations; and how metaphysics and scientific explanation relate to each other. I will discuss whether the metaphysics of mechanisms is reductionist, and whether it leaves room for the causal efficacy of higher-level phenomena. Finally, I hope to provide a starting point for new projects on issues in the philosophy of mind, such as non-reductive physicalism as a solution to the mind–body problem.

"[E]ine ausgesprochen hilfreiche Lektüre, die nicht nur professionellen Philosophen, sondern auch Studierenden eine umfassende und zugleich zugängliche Einführung in die mechanistische Debatte und ihre metaphysischen Annahmen bietet." (Jens Harbecke in Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 2021)

further review: Stuart Glennan in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2018

Further Books:

Einführung in die Philosophie der Psychologie - Ein Lehrbuch für Einsteiger (under contract). De Gruyter. (with chapters by Sabrina Coninx)

Edited Volumes, Special Issues: 

Topical collection in Synthese "Multiplexes and mechanisms in neuroscience and psychiatry" with Leon de Bruin and Linda Douw

Research Topic in Frontiers in Psychology "Situated Cognition and Its Critics: Recent Developments" with Albert Newen, Achim Stephan, Leon de Bruin

Articles, Book Chapters, etc.:

Krickel, B. (2022). Der Sitz des Geistes und das Unbewusste - Philosophische Probleme im Lichte Situierter Ansätze. In: Fink, H., Rosenzweig, R. (Hrsg.). "Wo sitzt der Geist? Von Leib und Seele zur erweiterten Kognition", Kortizes.

Book chapter, popular science

Krickel, B. (accepted). The Unconscious Mind Worry: A Mechanistic-Explanatory Strategy. Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2022.18

Journal article, peer reviewed

Krickel, B. (accepted). Epiphänomenalismus, in: Hoffmann-Kolss, V. (ed.), Handbuch Philosophie des Geistes, Metzler Verlag.

Book chapter

Krickel, B. (2022). Auf der Suche nach dem Unbewussten. Gehirn&Geist, 11/2022, 13-18.

Popular science article

Kohár, M., & Krickel, B. (2021). Compare and Contrast: How to Assess the Completeness of Mechanistic Explanation. In F. Calzavarini & M. Viola (Eds.), Neural Mechanisms - New Challenges in the Philosophy of Neuroscience (pp. 395–424). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_17

Book chapter, peer reviewed

Krickel, B. (2020). Reply to Cartwright, Pemberton, Wieten: “mechanisms, laws and explanation.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 10(3), 43. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-020-00312-x

Journal article, peer reviewed

Baumgartner, M., Casini, L., & Krickel, B. (2020). Horizontal Surgicality and Mechanistic Constitution. Erkenntnis, 85(2), 417–430. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0033-5

Journal article, peer reviewed

Krickel, B. (2020). Extended cognition, the new mechanists’ mutual manipulability criterion, and the challenge of trivial extendedness. Mind & Language, 35(4), 539–561. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12262

Journal article, peer reviewed

Newen, A., & Krickel, B. (2019). German Research Foundation (DFG) Research Training Group 2185 “Situated Cognition.” Neuroforum, 25(1). https://doi.org/10.1515/nf-2018-0024

Journal article

Craver, C. F., & Krickel, B. (2019). Mechanisms in Science. Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy, Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0395

Online bibliography, peer reviewed

Krickel, B. (2018). Are the states underlying implicit biases unconscious? – A Neo-Freudian answer. Philosophical Psychology, 31(7), 1007–1026. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1470323

Journal article, peer reviewed

Krickel, B. (2018). A Regularist Approach to Mechanistic Type-Level Explanation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 69(4), 1123–1153. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx011

Journal article, peer reviewed

Krickel, B. (2018). Saving the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 68, 58–67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.01.003

Journal article, peer reviewed

Kaiser, M. I., & Krickel, B. (2017). The Metaphysics of Constitutive Mechanistic Phenomena. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(3), 745–779. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axv058

Journal article, peer reviewed

Krickel, B. (2017). Making Sense of Interlevel Causation in Mechanisms from a Metaphysical Perspective. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 48(3), 453–468. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-017-9373-0

Journal article, peer reviewed

Krickel, B., & Reutlinger, A. (2013). Searle on Mental Causation – Biological Naturalism, or Something Near Enough, in: Backmann, M., Karakus, A., Michel, J. (Hrsg.), Münstersche Vorlesungen zur Philosophie: John R. Searle – Thinking About the Real World, 2013, Ontos Verlag.

Book chapter